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DETERMINABLES IN STOIC METAPHYSICS 
Determinables en metafísica estoica 
 
Abstract: In this paper, I will propose a solution to a puzzle presented by Chrysippus of Soli (279-
206 BC) the third head of the Stoic school. The puzzle concerns the criterion of identity; it has long 
been understood to appeal to concerns about diachronic identity, but I will show that it is relevant also 
to synchronic identity. The solution takes the form of an answer to the Growing Argument, an 
argument claiming that if a part, no matter how small, of an individual, changes, then the whole 
individual becomes non-identical to what it was before the change. With the Growing Argument as 
background, I will provide a form of metaphysical explanation framed by some relation characteristic 
of those holding between determinates and their determinables. 
Keywords: Hupokeimenon, Substrate, the peculiarly qualified, Identity IGA, Determinables, 
Determinates. 
Resumen: En este artículo, propondré una solución a un problema presentado por Crisipo de Soli 
(279-206 a.c.) el tercer director de la escuela estoica. El problema se refiere al criterio de identidad; 
durante mucho tiempo se ha entendido que apela a preocupaciones sobre la identidad diacrónica, 
pero mostraré que también es relevante para la identidad sincrónica. La solución toma la forma de 
una respuesta al argumento que afirma que si una parte, por pequeña que sea, de un individuo 
cambia, entonces el individuo en su totalidad se vuelve no idéntico a lo que era antes del cambio. 
Con este argumento como trasfondo, proporcionaré una forma de explicación metafísica entre los 
determinables y sus determinados. 
Palabras clave: Hupokeimenon, Sustrato, lo peculiarmente calificado, Identidad IGA, Determinables, 
Determinados. 
 
Introduction: the Growing Argument and its problems 
In this paper, I will propose a solution to a puzzle presented by Chrysippus of Soli 
(279-206BC) the third head of the Stoic school. The puzzle concerns the criterion of 
identity; it has long been understood to appeal to concerns about diachronic identity, 
but I will show that it is relevant also to synchronic identity. The solution takes the 
form of an answer to the Growing Argument, an argument claiming that if a part, no 
matter how small, of an individual, changes, then the whole individual becomes non-
identical to what it was before the change. With the Growing Argument as 
background, I will provide a form of metaphysical explanation framed by some 
relation characteristic of those holding between determinates and their 
determinables. 
The Stoics characterize three levels of existence. The substrate, the predisposed 
(as well as the relatively predisposed), the commonly qualified, and the peculiarly 
qualified. The substrate is concerned with the substances, the material that makes 
up for the bodies; the predisposed is the disposition the substance has to be united, 
or blended with another one; the commonly qualified is what is characteristic in 
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metaphysics as a Universal. But the Stoics thought about universals as bodies. 
Finally, the peculiarly qualified is the most interesting aspect. It is not an Aristotelian 
essence, but it is what makes an individual indistinguishable from other ones. 
To get started, I propose a united work done by the substrate and the peculiarly 
qualified. I will characterize this as substrate*. I choose this term because it 
relates substrates as hupokeimenon with the peculiarly qualified. It explains, in 
synthesis, the identity for peculiarly qualified objects. But it is still a substrate. We 
will see how the solution to the Growing Argument, a challenge posed by the 
academics, as it is presented by Chrysippus amounts to a characteristic feature in 
the relation among qualities (or properties) as determinables and determinates, 
determining the peculiarly qualified. 
The Growing Argument among academics was the argument claiming that if a part 
of individual changes, then the whole individual can no longer be the same individual 
as before. It is an argument that pertains to the properties of the parts into the whole. 
David Sedley explains the content of the argument from the point of view of its origins 
in Epicharmus, a comic poet from the period of the opening decade of the fifth 
century B.C. who made the argument famous, hence this problem of identity was in 
the philosophical waters even before Socrates was born: 
 
Character A is approached by Character B for payment of his subscription to the running 
expenses of a forthcoming banquet. Finding himself out of funds, he resorts to asking B the 
following riddle: ‘Say you took an odd number of pebbles, or if you like an even number, and 
chose to add or subtract a pebble: do you think it would still be the same number?’ 'No,' says 
B. 'Or again, say you took a measure of one cubit and chose to add, or cut off, some other 
length: that measure would no longer exist, would it? 'No.' 'Well now,' continues A, ‘think of 
men in the same way. One man is growing, another is diminishing, and all are constantly in 
the process of change. But what by its nature changes and never stays put must already be 
different from what it has changed from. You and I are different today from who we were 
yesterday, and by the same argument, we will be different again and never the same in the 
future. B agrees. A, then, concludes that he is not the same man who contracted the debt 
yesterday, nor indeed the man who will be attending the banquet. In that case, he can hardly 
be held responsible for the debt. B, exasperated, strikes A a blow. A protests at this treatment. 
But this time it is B who neatly sidesteps the protest, by pointing out that by now he is 
somebody quite different from the man who struck the blow a minute ago (Sedley, 1982, p. 
255). 
 
The amusement is essential in the story. The Stoics must have been delighted to 
have some myth on their own with the same comic structure. Zeno caught a slave 
of him stealing. “But I was fated to steal!” said the slave, appealing to Zeno’s 
determinism, “and that I should beat you for it!”, replied Zeno. The fault lies in Zeno, 
and in A from Epicharmus’ story above, for not presenting a suitable principle on 
which they hope to rely; in Epicharmus story, A needs to show what differences in 
the individual make a difference in the person just as much as in Zeno’s parody; 
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Zeno wants to show that exists an unavoidable course of actions and that we may 
nevertheless be punished for. Epicharmus’ and Zeno's stories are about 
responsibility and these two stories will inevitably overlap. That is why there must be 
some mistake in the Growing Argument as well as in Zeno’s determinism. It must be 
the case that there is some principle underlying in the situation; A must be 
responsible for contracting the debt and B for beating up A as well as the Slave for 
stealing, and Zeno for not laying down the proper principle for the slave on his 
determinism. 
But my topic is not about the responsibility the agents must have towards each other. 
My topic is about how the Growing Argument shows that there is something that 
makes two objects identical, how is it that we are the same despite undergoing 
changes in our bodies, and also how is it that we are different. I will try to explain 
whatever properties the identical objects must preserve. 
 
The notion of Identity in the Growing Argument 
My thesis is that the notion of Identity in the Growing Argument (IGA) is the 
following, IGA: An object o is identical to o* if they are both determined by D, which 
is a set of determinables properties in objects o and o* that determine the properties 
in o and o*. This is a thesis that has resemblances with the way the Platonists 
thought about growing. Along the same lines of IGA, there is a peculiar feature in 
the way Socrates conceives Forms as the efficient causes and argues for the 
immortality of the soul in the Phaedo (105a-e). He says that the opposites are 
excluded because of what they determine, as the number “two”, excludes its being 
odd, or fire excludes its being cold. In rejecting the arguments from the physicists (as 
Anaxagoras), Socrates treats identity and difference as a matter of particulars being 
derived by their Forms, hence, in a strictly metaphysical fashion (and I think that he 
could have considered the wrongness in the Growing Argument as a relation among 
properties as determinates and determinables) Forms are determined by the 
qualifying features in the properties the particular objects must-have. For the 
Stoics, the peculiarly qualified would be the feature that makes an endurance object 
what it is when being subject to change. But Socrates’ exposition of exclusion among 
opposites (determined objects) (Phaedo: 105a) also includes the oppositions of 
whatever determines them: 
 
Not only does the opposite not admit its opposite, but that which brings along some opposite 
into that which it occupies; that which brings this along will not admit the opposite to that which 
it brings along (In Grube, 1992, p. 90). 
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Namely, we can think that once something is determined as hot, the Hot will exclude 
the opposite of cold, and it is the fire that excludes the Cold, and the ice that excludes 
the Hot, as well as the Hot that excludes the Cold, and the Cold that excludes the 
Hot. But this is so because the Cold causes ice, and the Hot causes fire. The Hot 
doesn’t produce the heat, and nor the Cold the freezing temperature. But the Hot 
and the Cold as Forms, (efficient causes and objects of knowledge) produce what 
we know about the heat and the freezing temperature. 
The crucial passage to characterize the objections to the explanations of the natural 
sciences according to Stephen Menn (2009) is in the Phaedo 96c3 - 97b3. Menn 
divides the passage in four sections where Socrates speaks: 
 
(I) For I was then so intensely blinded by this investigation even to the things which I had 
previously understood clearly, as it had seemed to myself and to others, that I unlearned even 
the things which I previously thought I knew, about many things and in particular about why a 
man being grows. For previously I thought it was clear to everyone that it was on account of 
eating and drinking: for when from the food fleshes are added to fleshes and bones to bones, 
and likewise, kindred things are added to each of the others, then the mass which was small 
has afterward become large, an in this way the small human being becomes large. So, I 
thought at that time: and doesn’t that seem to you like a fair judgment? (In Grube, 1992, p. 83). 
 
Until here the passage is about how we can combine kindred objects with kindred 
objects and make an object of the same kind bigger. But the object is big now 
because of its Bigness, and was small because of its Smallness, and not because 
of the objects that have been blended. Until here, there is something that makes the 
objects being occupants of what the Stoics will characterize as 
a substrate (hupokeimenon) (I will further argue for this). 
But, then, Socrates in Phaedo 96c, explains that the physicists were wrong because 
they thought about blending substances as a feature that takes place only among 
corporeal and kindred objects. Socrates continues: 
 
(II) Then examine these things too I thought it seemed enough to me that when one human 
being standing next to another appears large, and the other one small, he is larger by a head, 
and likewise when a horse appears greater than another horse (In Grube, 1992, p. 84). 
 
Namely, there is something that makes objects o and o* characteristically 
measurable, the qualitative aspect in the objects that makes them being bigger or 
smaller. This is what the qualifying feature the Stoics will further characterize. The 
blending of substances is completely qualitative. It takes place among the properties 
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the objects have. But objects are of all kinds. Not only corporeal. Blending, then, 
takes place among abstracta (or maybe the following is a case of transition for the 
Stoics see, Long and Sedley 39D): 
 
(III) and even clearer than these, ten seemed to me to be greater than eight on account of two 
being added to it, and the two-cubit to be great than the one-cubit-long on account of exceeding 
it by half (In Grube, 1992, p. 84). 
 
So, blending substances is not a matter of the peculiarly qualified, among objects, 
as the Stoics will later think, nor is it a matter of kindred objects, as Socrates intends 
to show. Socrates then continues: 
 
(IV) By Zeus’, he said, ‘I am far from thinking that I know the cause of any of these things, I 
who do not even accept from myself, when someone add a one to a one, either that the one 
to which the addition was made has become two, or that the one which was added and the 
one it was added to became two on account of the addition of the one to the other: for I am 
astonished if when each of them was separate from the other, each of them was one and they 
were not then two, but when they have approached each other, this is a cause to them of their 
becoming two, the occurrence of their being put nose to each other. Nor, if someone divide a 
one, can I still be persuaded that this too is a cause of their having become two, the division: 
for the cause of becoming two is the contrary of what it was before. For before the cause was 
that they were brought together and one was added to the other, whereas now the cause is 
that one is brought apart and separated from the other (In Grube, 1992, p. 84). 
 
Gregory Vlastos (1973) thinks that in (I), (II) it is not about causes, it is about 
explanations in general: one thing is bigger than another because of Bigness added 
to it, not because of whatever corporeal feature was added, so, Vlastos thinks that 
the explanations are alluding to the “four becauses” of the Aristotelian 
characterization, the formal, the efficient, the material and the prime cause, 
respectively. But the characterization of the Stoics will provide confines itself with a 
relation among the substrate and the peculiarly qualified. In a way, it is more elegant 
and economical. This is what I will argue further. But, before that, let’s see how the 
explanations relate the Growing Argument with another area of speculation in 
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The immortality of the Soul 
The argument of the immortality of the soul provided by Socrates in 
the Republic book X from 608d to 611d has a nuance that is worth considering as 
well. The Growing Argument comes to mind. Socrates claims in 610b: 
 
Let’s never say that the soul even comes close to being destroyed by a fever or any other 
disease, or by killing for that matter—not even if one were to cut the entire body into the very 
smallest pieces—until someone demonstrate to us that these conditions of the body make the 
soul itself more unjust and more impious (In Grube, 1974, p. 1214). 
 
Namely, people might argue that “a dying man does become more unjust” (610d) 
because the soul depends on the body, and with no body, no object on which to 
apply the just remains. But what determines what? Does the body determine the 
goodness of the soul or the soul determine the goodness of the body? Socrates 
proceeds: 
 
We are sure to reply that if what he says is true, injustice must be as deadly as a disease to 
those who have it and that those who catch it must die because of its own deadly nature—with 
the worst cases dying quickly and the less serious ones more slowly (610d). 
 
So, it is natural for the unjust soul to die quicker than it is for the just one. Namely, 
Socrates will attempt a reductio for the position claiming that the soul depends on 
the body, and arguing in favor of the conclusion that the bodily aspect of being just 
depends on the soul. Socrates’ argument is explicitly correlated with the Growing 
Argument in the Phaedo 96c (I). No matter how small we direct the body, the soul 
will not be touched. And no matter how kindred corporeal objects might be subject 
to change, the explanation relies upon the Bigness or Smallness. And this is why 
Socrates responded to Crito claiming that he did not understand that when his body 
dies, he will not die. Socrates argues that the moral properties of the parts, the body, 
are independent of the moral properties of the soul. The goddess or badness in the 
body cannot affect the soul, and that is why no matter how small the change is 
undertaken in the body, it will not affect the person who is responsible for his deeds; 
the goodness or badness of the soul can affect the body, but the goodness or 
badness in the body cannot affect the soul. 
The latter points to a solution among academics for the Growing Argument. The 
position alluded claims that what determines the moral properties of the soul is 
independent of what determines the moral properties of the body. The determinable 
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properties characteristic of the just, or impious, determines a determinate soul, while 
the determinables of the moral properties determine a determinate body. The just is 
determinable for the soul, not for the body. Morality, on the other hand, is concerned 
only with the body, it determines corporeal effects or consequences. Hence, for Plato 
in the Phaedo 96c, the Growing Argument is conceived as a problem about what 
determines what. He might be thinking about the determinables of the just soul and 
how the just is engaged with the good life in the Republic book X from 608d to 611d, 
regardless of whatever changes the body might undertake. But why are A and B in 
Epicharmus’ story two in number? It is because twonnes is added. 
There must be some criterion of identity to individuate why A and B, in Epicharmus’ 
story, whatever they are, as two in number, which hopefully, given the necessity of 
identity, could explain why they are distinct even if, for some predicate F, they are 
the same F. Namely, even if they are predicated of something, of necessity, they are 
still different. The same predicate applies in different situations as well. This is why 
professor Bailey (2014b) thinks that the explanation requires the “necessity” 
component for Socrates, and not only its sufficiency. A predicate of being “the 
president of Mexico” could be attributed to different individuals in different 
circumstances, namely, on different possible worlds and at different times. But what 
we require, if our duty is to provide necessary truths, is to present the case that 
explains of necessity why something is caused by X, and not sometimes by X and 
sometimes by Y, as well why Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador occupies the position, 
of necessity, of being the president of Mexico in time t and world w. 
Compare the Growing Argument, as stated, with the Lazy Argument also discussed 
at great length by the Stoics in order to relate it with Zeno’s determinism. If the world 
is deterministic, and if it is part of the fate of A that he will be receiving a blow, then 
B is not responsible for his violent act. This is so because the determination of the 
identity is not properly laid out. No one can be held responsible for their acts, as A 
risks from his own position, because the criterion of identity was not being presented 
clearly, neither in Epicharmus’ story nor in Zeno’s determinism, which is an argument 
that alludes to the world as determinate by every and each one of the causes in turn. 
The relation between determinables and their determinates is a one-many relation 
between properties; meanwhile, the distinct idea of determinism is a modal property 
of a relation between causes or networks of them. For Zeno’s determinism, there is 
only the actual world. But, as I shall argue, these otherwise quite different kinds of 
relations are not in fact logically independent. The reason why the world is not 
deterministic, if indeed it is not, is that some causes are not fully determinate, hence, 
not causing an event X of necessity. As I shall show, some efficient causes are 
sufficient for their effects without necessitating them; and their failure to necessitate 
what they nevertheless cause follows from the fact that these causes are not fully 
determinate. 
So, what is the relation taking place between determinables and determinates? This 
is the way to think about the problem of identity under The Growing Argument, hence, 
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under IGA, e.g., red is the determinable of one of its indefinitely many determinates, 
crimson. They are not necessarily identical, but they're identical by IGA. Chronic pain 
is a determinate of pain, and a desire for ice cream is a determinate of a desire, that 
is the determinable, but they are not necessarily identical with their further 
determinates, although, chronic pain is (with the “is” of identity) pain by IGA. Neither 
are the determinables and determinates equivalent. In parallel, something is 
determinate in an action; the cause of A contracting his debt, having the effect of B 
punching A in Epicharmus’ story. Both, cause and effect in this sense are 
determinates. But there is the determinable; their respective decision, intention, and 
their respective character. B is exasperated and A is irresponsible with the “is” of 
identity. Hence, there is a logical space among determinables and their determinates 
that allows conceiving something that identifies the individuals A and B, as being 
what they are by IGA, and maybe something that holds them responsible for their 
action in a determinable way, even if our topic is metaphysical, and not that of 
responsibility. 
 
Chrysippus on determinables 
The illustration I provided regarding the relation of determinables-determinates will 
become useful in what follows. Chrysippus, ingeniously, uses a puzzle to help us 
understand what’s wrong with the Growing Argument. Imagine a man named Dion, 
and then, imagine that you can isolate the body from Dion-minus-one-foot, who, for 
our purposes, we could claim that is another man named Theon. Now, let’s say that 
we grab Dion after being amputated that leaves him with the same body as Theon: 
 
Chrysippus, the most distinguished member of their school, in his work On the Growing 
Argument, creates a freak of the following kind. Having first established that it is impossible for 
two peculiarly qualified individuals to occupy the same substance jointly, he says: 'For the sake 
of argument, let one man be thought of as whole-limbed, the other as minus one foot. Let the 
whole-limbed one be called Dion, the defective one Theon. Then let one of Dion's feet be 
amputated. ’The question arises which one of them has perished, and his claim is that Theon 
is the stronger candidate […]  how can it be that Theon, who has had no part chopped off, has 
been snatched away, while Dion, whose foot has been amputated, has not perished? 
‘Necessarily', says Chrysippus.'For Dion, the one whose foot has been cut off has collapsed 
into the defective substance of Theon, and two peculiarly qualified individuals cannot occupy 
the same substrate. Therefore, it is necessary that Dion remains while Theon has 
perished (Long and Sedley, 1987, pp. 171-172). 
 
The peculiarly qualified is characterized as what makes an object, in this case, a 
corporal object, being what it is. Individuals can be characterized as in some sense 
including substrates (hupokeimena) their matter being conceived independently of 
the predicates obtaining at them at a time (huparchein) (see D. T. J. Bailey, 2014a) a 
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characteristic feature of synchronic identity. Substrates are thus the underlying 
nature of things subsisting in them. Hence, the reason why Dion survives and Theon 
is no longer there, is because two peculiarly qualified bodies cannot occupy the 
same substrate. But better, the identity of the body cannot be presented by the 
peculiarly qualified individual Theon, for, even if he was there as a part of the 
individual Dion, the peculiarly qualified individual in the substrate, or part, namely, 
Theon, has to disappear. It could be that this is Chrysippus's way of thinking about 
this because Dion is an individual in a better consolidation than Theon; Dion is a 
person and Theon is only a “torso”, and not a person (See Burke, 1994). So, Theon 
is a determinate part of Dion, the individual to which its torso belonged. But, what 
Chrysippus is arguing is that the individual Dion is different from its peculiar 
quality and part named Theon, and when they share the substrate, it becomes 
evident that even two individuals similar in all respects, cannot be identical [i] again, 
because they cannot occupy the same substrate. I will claim that this is rather a 
problem that arises due to the determinate Theon and the determinable Dion as 
characterized by the IGA, which is how I will explain the relation taking place from the 
substrate to the peculiarly qualified individual, namely, the body. 
In the context in which Chrysippus will be presenting his own solution to the puzzle, 
he is thinking that, at the start of the experiment, “Dion” is the proper name of some 
whole. “Theon” is the name of a proper part of this whole; hence by Stoic 
assumptions about the part-whole relation, Theon is not different from Dion. When 
the proper part becomes presently indistinguishable from the whole, what happens 
is that the part is eliminated by the erstwhile whole. The idea of the substrate is 
relevant here. It is what makes it the case that one of them should be excluded: 
according to Chrysippus, substrates cannot be shared, even if now it was once a 
part of the other. Also, it is what makes it the case that two individuals sharing every 
(empirically detectable) property could still be two in number, here distinct. Due 
to the substrate, the part ceases to be when it comes to having the 
same substrate as the now altered whole. But put more bluntly, what happens is not 
that the part is the one that should be now replacing the whole. Just because some 
whole is no more does not mean there is no longer any whole: for every whole, it is 
the one that determines its own parts; its parts are always determinate given some 
whole, not the other way around. Parts enjoy their identity only in relation to a whole. 
Perhaps this makes the Stoics look more Platonists than Aristotelians. But this is so 
because the relation of determination has various aspects that we need to 
emphasize. First: 
 
Substrates: substrates are independent of what determinate individuals are 
obtained in them. Substrates come to exist robustly when they allude to what is true, 
namely, what is obtained, having an individual related to a substrate, and, secondly, 
as long as they do not interact in the world, hence: 




Determinables: the substrate (hupokeimenon) of an individual can usefully be 
understood as determinable for an individual. 
 
My thesis is that substrates as determinables show how 
the hupokeimenon collapses into being the substrate of a different peculiarly 
qualified individual, and this could be explained by the following example. Take the 
substrate of “being the president of Mexico”. There is an individual occupying it, 
namely, Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador in the present time and (actual) world. We 
need to consider functions as the relation taking place among the substrate and the 
individual who is obtained. 
 
Substrates*: The substrate* s is a function F from world-times to individuals: it is of 
type (iωτ) 
 
Substrates* are what descriptions denote, although they do not denote the individual 
who happens to occupy the substrate (without the *). Here, ω is the type of a world 
and τ is the type of a time. When we assign an individual to a substrate* as its 
occupant we specify how an individual is being obtained as a distinctive niche within 
a world ω and a time τ. With substrates* at hand, we can now formulate the solution 
to the problem of how it is that if we substitute, say, Theon for Dion, two peculiarly 
qualified individuals, in the same substrate, as an individual in a substrate*. What 
happens is that there is a function mapping individual into substrates, which is the 
substrate*. So, now, our claim that predicates being attached to Dion and Theon are 
of the same substrate* is fleshed out. Namely, it is a function in the mapping sense 
of individuals (ι) to truth values (o) through a world-time (ωτ) which happen to 
contingently coincide. Hence, the substrate* is determinable for the substrate, which 
in turn is determinable for the peculiarly qualified individual, Dion. Not so for Theon, 
who happens to be determinate of Dion, and happens to be obtained in a world-time, 
without eliminating Theon, the other peculiarly qualified individual, but, mapping both 
through the same substrate*. So, as long as names of the peculiarly 
qualified individuals and their respective descriptions are similar when attaching 
predicates to Dion and Theon, their descriptions will refer to substrates* in the 
following way: 
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Denotation: A description d1 (in a language L) denotes a substrate* if of the 
predicate F as attached to Dion or Theon depending on the world-time in which the 
peculiarly qualified individual occupies the substrate. 
 
Along the same lines of the problems that can be confronted by substituting Theon 
for Dion in Chrysippus’ puzzle, we find problems with extensionalism on predicates, 
namely, with the following thesis: 
 
Predicate Extensionalism (henceforth PE): Two predicates are coextensive if they 
are true of the same objects (in fact) and so every property is identified with its 
extension. 
 
The problem with PE is that predicates could be iterated in a wide variety of ways 
referring to different objects, e.g., “moving the lips and throat in such and such a way” 
is not the same as “singing”, even when the phenomena taking place is the same. 
But they refer to the same thing for PE. So, PE doesn’t have the resources to 
distinguish the different peculiar qualities or properties as different objects within the 
same individual. Not even aspects of the same individual. For PE the wide variety of 
predicates referring to the same object is just a matter of shifting from speaking of 
objects to speaking about words. We can speak of the same object in different ways. 
So, we need to introduce properties of substrates* as well as properties for 
individuals: 
 
Properties: Predicates denote properties; mappings from world-times to classes of 
entities. A one-place property P can be truly predicated of a substrate* s if and only 
if (a) either P is an individual property and the individual that is obtained in the 
substrate* has P, or (b) it’s a substrate* property and the substrate* itself has it. 
 
If we were to introduce Properties for PE, we would be rather 
introducing Properties for substrates* as well, we would have a rather robust 
ontological framework. This is the robust framework in which Chrysippus seemed to 
flesh out his solution to the puzzle. This system makes the Stoics look more 
Platonists than Aristotelians, but that is a price to pay for the solution that Chrysippus 
evokes. It has explanatory power in different domains within the Stoic system, as we 
will see. His solution to the Growing Argument amounts to a projection of ingenious 
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nourishment for the Stoic system against the Platonists, as well as explicating many 
problems within the Platonist system. 
 
Explanatory power as Stoic Commensurateness under Chrysippus’ 
solution to the Growing Argument 
If I break the window and if you ask me, why did I break it, it would not be correct to 
point out to some nomological character in the phenomena that took place in our 
surroundings, e.g., it would be useless for the purposes you are asking me to 
consider to claim that it was because rocks are harder than crystal. If I offer these 
kinds of explanations, you would certainly think that my explanations would be 
mistaken. Rather, if I claim that it is because I was angry, then that would have 
explained why I broke the window better than specifying any other plethora of 
phenomena. 
There is one of the explanations, specifically, that characterizes the event, namely, 
by the predicate being angry as a determinate of my character, and my character 
being what properly explains why I broke the window. Notice now how if you ask me 
why I am wearing a red shirt, I could provide a specific explanation. It would be 
different than the one I could provide if you ask me why is my shirt red, and even 
further, your question would point to something really interesting if you simply ask: 
“why is red?”. That would be like asking why is red a color. It would strike you as a 
false form of explanation if I say that it is red because I see it red for these two forms 
of questions. That would be question-begging, at most. My seeing it red would not 
amount to why I am wearing a red shirt, neither to why it is red, which is what you 
are pointing out. In this case, you are asking me again to offer a form of explanation 
that should be specific for the event in question, not for the Form in question. 
If something is of a specific color in virtue of its being red, then this amounts to why is 
it is of that color. The color could explain its being red. Intentional explanations 
correspond to this form. Very commonly, they reflect some properties in the 
explanation that allows considering why two individuals with all properties need not 
be mutually exclusive unless they are occupying the same substrate*, which is 
something Chrysippus’ solution to the Growing Argument is inviting us to consider. 
We have now noticed that determinables are something like thin properties, e.g., 
color, sound, and taste. Determinates could be thick properties 
like red, loud, and sweet, respectively for each determinable. If determinables are 
determinates of other determinables, then perhaps this is something that can be 
easily explored in this context due to transitivity. Determination amounts to some 
form of universalization: if an object O has feature F and instantiates feature G at t, 
then every other object O* with feature F must instantiate feature G at t*. This entails 
in turn the relation of determination of G in F. Determination, hence, could mean that 
there cannot be a difference in a set of properties without some difference in another 
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set of properties. This is the main concept underlying the position of determination 
as the one intently discussed by the Stoics as Fate (see Long and Sedley, 1987, 55). 
This is why we could also include the same notion in a discussion of Zeno’s 
determinism. 
A logic of determinables at hand is presented by Yablo (1992) in this way: 
 
Property F determines property G if for a thing to be F is for it to be G, not simpliciter, but in a 
specific way, and F determines G only if: necessarily, for all x, if x has G, then x has F; and 
possibly, for some x, x has F but lacks G (p. 262). 
 
This thesis is constituted by two notions. The first part on the right-hand side of the 
biconditional claims that if any property is of a specific nature, then it is determined 
by its nature. The second part on the right-hand side of the next biconditional claims 
that a thing with a specific nature is necessary of that specific nature, and the 
specificity is contingent on its nature. 
Notice how these relations are characteristic of the solution that figured in the 
Growing Argument offered by Chrysippus, and the one-under IGA happens to be the 
same. Explaining why Dion is the one who survives is because of its substrate*. 
Chrysippus notion with IGA entail the following thesis for this form of explanations: 
 
Commensurateness: when the determinable property is commensurate to the 
effect, it becomes determinate (see figure 1 below).  
 
Due to commensurateness, determinables can become determinates. The 
explanation of Dion being the one who survives could be fruitful for the purposes of 
explicating through commensurateness. For even when Theon could have been a 
part of Dion, and Dion being turned into a body identical with Theon, still, Dion, the 
determinable, is the one who survives: 
 





When a coalition takes place, the vertical line tells us at what point the horizontal 
lines are correctly matching the determinate, so that they are genuine explanatory 
causes of the effect, which is the intersection taking place in the collapsing of the 
diagonal line into one of the determinates that it's being picked. The vertical line of 
causation becomes commensurate to the effect. 
Schemas over debates in contemporary philosophy of mind, concerned with the 
notion of supervenience (see Kim, 2005) as an explanation of the irreducibility or 
reducibility of the mental to the physical are of this type. But the problem that arises 
with this schema is that we could have a chain of determinables determining other 
determinates, probably, in an unbounded chain due to its transitivity. Just like an 
unbounded chain of causes and effects, having effects as causes, we could have in 
our place a chain of determinates being determinables of other determinates. The 
contemporary consensus is that the most determinate properties are always more 
explanatory powerful (although, this is contested by Wilson, 2012). 
But this problem is avoided by grounds that are characteristic of 
the determinable properties. If there could be being evil as the determinable of being 
bad, as its determinate, which in turn is a determinable of other determinate 
like being cruel, then we could iterate predicates without a lowest bound, and neither 
un upper bound. The same could happen for the ordered set. Succinctly, we could 
ask if the ellipsis halts at some point. But here is an answer.  Introduce substrates*. 
We stop the chain of explanations with the deictic expression “this is Spanish 
crimson” (see figure 1) referring to the substrate*; we point to what makes Spanish 
crimson as the color it is with no need to follow further explanations in the chain of 
determinables and determinates being determinables of other determinates. But 
now, another form of the objection could still arise to this view: if its substrate* is due 
to its own determinable (what makes it a determinate), then this iteration would 
hardly let us understand what is a substrate*. This distinction could undermine its 
own purpose, namely, provide the best understanding of the properties 
for substrates*, and even, provide a good metaphysical explanation of the relation 
among quality and objects having those qualities. For, if there is a substrate*, then it 
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is not qualitative. Substrates* provide ontological determinacy to the indeterminacy 
that the logic of determinables seems to invite. But every substrate* property could 
accompany the unbounded chain of iterations among determinables and 
determinates being determinables of other determinates, maybe, until we find a 
gunky universe (see Nolan, 2006). Then, the ellipsis halts. If an explanation is going 
to do its work, then the determinable needs to be commensurate to the determinate, 
producing an effect, or an event in question. 
Commensurateness is distinguished by two 
properties, contingency, and necessity. Contingency is the claim that there could be 
an F, which is a determinable with no G, which is a determinate 
property. Necessity is the converse form, that for every determinate G, it is 
necessary that it is an F. To see why this is a good approximation to the problem of 
identity presented at the beginning under IGA, and why it is an entirely Stoic 
approximation that solves as well problems for the Platonists, think of an example of 
the problem that arises when we take two different types of phenomena as one: it is 
because they are mapped by the same substrate*. But more specifically, we will 
think about the problems that arise with identity under the incorporeals. The best 
example is the Lekta, or the Sayables. 
 
Lekta as causes  
Evidence from the writings of the Stoics shows that for them cause is bodily or 
material; or at least, the left-hand side of the causal relation is corporeal. For the 
Stoics, whatever happens, having a cause in the world, is corporeal or material. But 
they also show that effects have an informational aspect too, a non-bodily effect: 
 
The stoics say that every cause is a body that causes something incorporeal in a body. For 
example, a scalpel, which is a body, causes in flesh, which is a body, the incorporeal predicate 
‘being cut’ (Inwood and Gerson, 2008, p. 211). 
 
What is followed by the cause could be a state of affairs or an event. But mostly, 
there is something graspable by our thought. It is a predicate, like ‘being cut’ when 
the scalpel is causing the cut in my finger. They are predicates in relation to an object, 
like ‘having thirst’, or ‘being hungry’, which can be caused by the lack of water or the 
lack of food in the body, respectively. Compare the view presented by Stoics in the 
puzzle of lekta, or sayable; the incorporeals among incorporeals. We come to 
understand predicate position only because there is an invariant phenomenon in our 
minds, the content of our thought — the lekta (as complete sayables) is what is 
ordered, and what helps us to understand other incorporeal like a place, time, and 
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the void. In an explicit and comprehensive study of Stoic metaphysics, Professor D. 
T. J. Bailey (2014a) comments on the latter: 
 
Intuitively there is some sort of priority among the incorporeals enjoyed by complete sayables. 
For only complete sayables stand in a certain asymmetric relation to the other kinds of 
incorporeals. All the incorporeals bring with them sayables, automatically. If there are times, 
places, and the void, then there are true and false propositions about times, places, and the 
void. And complete sayables themselves bring more of their own kind in their train: if there are 
true and false propositions, then there are true and false propositions about those propositions 
(Bailey, 2014a, p. 258). 
 
Hence, lekta, invariant and ordered, subsume other incorporeals because bivalence 
is the realm of lekta, and everything is subsumed under bivalence. And I would add 
to what Professor Bailey claims, that Lekta is great example of the substrates* of the 
substrates. 
There are incomplete sayables and complete sayables. On one hand, complete ones 
are sentence-like as long as they are contingent. Deicticts, for this matter, which I 
used to present the way commensurateness takes place, due to substrates*, on the 
last section, conform complete sayables as when we say “This man”. As we noticed 
before, they are grammatically well-formed sentences, like ‘Javier is drinking wine’ 
and ‘This man is drinking wine’. On the other hand, incomplete ones are predicates 
like ‘drinks wine’. In this manner, the name Javier would be also an incomplete 
sayable. But both kinds transfer meaning and gives us an understanding of what we 
allude to in the world. A problem arises because as long as they interact with 
qualifying individuals, they need to be confronted with the idea that whatever 
interacts in the world has to be corporeal. As we see it, this is not a real problem for 
the Stoics, and this is explainable by a specific kind of complete sayables: deictics. 
The relation of corporals and incorporeals, evidenced by the lekta that Stoics 
characterized in their view, is directly connected to the view Chrysippus was 
presenting in the argument from the last section. The criteria of identity are linked to 
the fact that two individuals cannot occupy the same substrate*, even when they can 
occupy the same substrate. This argument is in company with the determination in 
determinants view of the Stoics, claiming that whatever has the capacity to act in the 
world and produce effects has to be bodily, as Seneca in Letters on ethics claims: 
 
Our school believes that the good is a body because that which is good acts and whatever 
acts is a body. What is good benefits [someone], but for something to benefit [someone] it 
ought to act, and if it acts, it is a body? [Platonists] say that wisdom is good; it follows that it is 
also necessary to say that it is corporeal. But being wise is not in the same category. It is an 
incorporeal attribute of something else, namely, wisdom; consequently, it neither acts nor 
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benefits [anyone]. “What then?” he says, “Do we not say that being wise is good?” (In Inwood, 
2008, p. 90). 
 
When contemporary philosophers over debates in philosophy of mind claim that 
something is not active in the world, but still is acted on and is dependent on what is 
active, they use the title “epiphenomena” — which are properties floating free of any 
causal chain. Seneca, from the passage above, is reconstructing the problem when 
meshing the subject position with the predicate position, correlated with the bodily 
(cause) and the incorporeal (the effect or the predicate), respectively. In this sense, 
the effect would be mere epiphenomena. And, in our debate over passage 96c in 
the Phaedo, if the good is not corporeal then it cannot be active. But this is what the 
Stoics did not conceive as a problem; for them, there are no such things as 
epiphenomena. They were considering that a determinable is an efficient aspect in 
a property when it is commensurate to the effect and becomes determinate, 
corporeal. The form of the principle that we can consider as the weak principle of 
determination in determinants is the following: 
 
            CP. If x causes y, and x is C, then y is C (where C is corporeal). 
 
This would be denied by the Stoics if we do not include qualifying properties of C, 
and further, if we do not include incorporeals as the efficient aspects of the properties 
in C. Notice that from this thesis we cannot infer that whatever causes y, and if y is I, 
then x has to be I (where I is incorporeal). The relation of this principle is not 
symmetric. It does not transfer the properties of the effect to the causes, but it does 
transfer the properties of the cause to some of the effects. 
The way we have posed the question could be interpreted differently when presented 
against Platonists — indicating that the question could refer to an identity between 
the thing said and the thing referred, namely, the corporeal and the incorporeal, 
respectively. CP conflicts with something Seneca is also pointing out, which is the 
following thesis: 
 
      S. Sayables, complete and incomplete ones, are effects, and as sayables 
they are incorporeals. 
 
S includes part of what is acted on. Due to CP, which is a thesis characteristic of 
determination in determinants, there could be something going on in our body as 
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cause and effect. When something causes in our mind to grasp a sayable there could 
be a brain state, or a bodily state, allowing us to move our lips, tongue, nerves, and 
the synaptic interaction in our brains. But that is not what we are most interested in 
when we recognize that there are sayables. They are the informational state 
captured by the meaning, the meaning of our expressions, and meaning is not 
corporeal neither information. 
This is why there cannot be an identity either among predicates for then one thing 
would be corporeal and incorporeal at the same time, which is impossible according 
to the criterion of the substrates* which we already discussed in our last section, 
where bivalence, the realm of the lekta, is respected. That is why the question of 
whether being wise is good is presented by the academics and discussed by Seneca, 
to wit, because the good can cause something in the world. In this sense, the Stoics 
might have accepted what came to be named as the Eleatic principle to account for 
the good as being an efficient cause, which provides the basis of CP. This principle, 
which here I interpreted as CP, appears in Plato’s Dialogue entitled the Sophist and 
is found in the following passage? (247 D 8—E 4) when the stranger from Elea is 
speaking: 
 
I mean that a thing really is if it has any capacity at all, either by nature to do something to 
something else, or to have even the smallest thing done to it, even by the most trivial thing, 
and even if only once. I’ll take it as a definition that beings are nothing other than those things 
with capacity. (In Bailey, 2014a, p. 258).  
 
This principle could mean that whatever can cause and whatever can be subject to 
causing joins the respectable notion of being; non entia non grata. And if this is the 
case, then, as long as predicates are caused, and if whatever is caused has “even 
the smallest thing done to it”, then predicates also earn their place in what is being, 
and not only bodily things. They are somethings. 
The way Seneca is presenting the idea when discussing if wisdom is good because 
it causes, and hence, the good is corporeal as well as wisdom, indicates that the 
answer is subtler: it is not an identity of what is in play among the good and wisdom, 
the determinable and the determinate as becoming identical, it is IGA. It is rather this 
notion taking place. Both depend on their fundamental determinable. The evidence 
is found next in the same paragraph where Seneca further claims: “We do say so 
but only by reference to that on which it depends, i.e., to wisdom itself” (In Bailey, 
2014a, p. 258).  [ii] Where dependence is that simple notion of how a determinate in 
a property depends on its determinable. 
Wisdom is a body according to Seneca, and it is the causal power of a body we have 
in mind when we say “wisdom is good” because we refer to that on which it depends. 
Hence, Wisdom could be the determinable of knowing peculiar things for life and 
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wellbeing. ’Being wise’ is good because it depends on wisdom itself, which in turn, 
for Platonists, depends on the good, but for Stoics, depends on something that has 
to be bodily: wisdom itself as the commonly qualified, which, causes the peculiarly 
qualified of being wise. The way this works is because ‘being wise’ is not bodily and 
is good, and it need not be a body in order to play the role it does in wisdom’s making 
thing’s good. It is just a necessary condition for the activity of wisdom. In this sense, 
it is what explains fundamentally, what grounds its further determinates. 
Seneca referred to wisdom as the cause, which cannot be an incorporeal acting in 
the world because everything that acts on the world is corporeal. But he allows that 
‘being wise’, which in principle is incorporeal, is something we could have in thought, 
something that is said of something but not that causes something directly in the 
world. This is so because it is “dependent”, as he emphatically claims. But it cannot 
be a mere epiphenomenon either, because these effects cause something in turn, 
and that is so even when they have a dependent on something corporeal, in this 
case, ’wisdom’. Hence, this might seem like if Seneca is presenting the thesis that 
there are cases when the incorporeal depends on the corporeal and confronting it 
with the thesis held by later Platonists: there are cases where the corporeal depends 
on the incorporeal (as shown in the beginning). But rather, what is going on is that 
Seneca is presenting the case where due to the fact that the so-called dependent 
property is the determinable property, then the event could have a determinate, but 
the cause need not be the determinate, instead, it could be the determinable 
identifiable by IGA with the property that is doing the work of explaining. 
 
Conclusion 
This notion of determinable and determinates, therefore, appears in the solution of 
the puzzle that can be confronted in the explanation of what makes the relation of 
incorporeals and corporeals unproblematic for the Stoics. The notion of 
metaphysical dependence and causation, hence, is made explicit by the 
characterization of determinables and determinates already illuminated by Stoic 
metaphysics when including the work substrates* can do in solution to the Growing 
Argument presented by Chrysippus, the third head of the Stoic school. Our notion of 
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Notes 
[i] Compare this observation with the principle of the identity of indiscernibles, where, 
if two individuals share every property, then they are one. In contrast, compare it 
with the indiscernibility of identicals, where if two individuals are the same, then, they 
must have every property shared in common. The second one seems more obvious 
than the first one. For discussion of these principles see Max Black “The identity of 
indiscernibles”, in Mind Vol. 51 (1952 pp. 204-16) 
[ii] Wisdom, as a peculiar universal, is working as the substrate for every wise person. 
The problem of universals in stoic metaphysics is better characterized, in this context, 
by D. T. J. Bailey in “The Structure of Stoic Metaphysics”, in Oxford Studies of 
Ancient Philosophy, Vol 46, 2014. 
 
